



BRITISH COLUMBIA POLICE COMMISSION

**RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
THE USE OF LESS THAN LETHAL FORCE BY
POLICE OFFICERS IN BRITISH COLUMBIA**

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This document on the use of less than lethal force by municipal police in British Columbia was prepared as a committee report for the British Columbia Police Commission. The report does not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission, the Solicitor General of British Columbia, nor the Government of the Province of British Columbia.

"Non-lethal weapons offer an opportunity to save life and to avoid the uncomfortable and sometimes devastating consequences that can accompany police shootings. We currently appear to be on the threshold of the discovery of weapons and chemicals that will provide safe and functional substitutes for death-dealing guns."

from: **"Non-Lethal Weapons:
The Potential and the Pitfalls"
Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice,
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Gilbert Geis and Arnold Binder**



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Section 1 Introduction

Section 1.1 Origin of the Report

On February 14, 1989 the Chief Coroner of the Province of British Columbia, Mr. J.V. Cain, forwarded to the Solicitor General a copy of recommendations made by a Coroner's Jury. The Coroner's Inquest in question related to an incident where police officers had fatally wounded a knife wielding suspect. The recommendations were as follows:

***"RESEARCH -** that the Justice Institute or other appropriate agency be funded immediately to structure a task force to research alternatives to the use of deadly force by police. We ask that this task force include in its work, study of impact weapons, "Capsicum" and other non-lethal agents."*

Section 1.2 Establishment of the Committee

The Solicitor General subsequently referred the matter to the British Columbia Police Commission and in May of 1989 the following committee was appointed to conduct research and prepare this report:

Inspector J.P. Jamieson, Committee Chairman, Executive Officer,
B.C. Police Commission

Mr. R. Hull, Committee Member, Deputy Director,
Justice Institute of B.C.

Sergeant P. Battershill, Committee Member, Vancouver Police Department,
Emergency Response Team Leader

Section 1.3 Mandate of the Committee

The objectives of the Committee were established as follows:

- A. to review current police practice, options, and resources on hand;
- B. to establish an overview of less than lethal force weapons and options available to the police in 1989/90;
- C. to establish operational and training requirements for less than lethal force weapons or alternatives; and
- D. to make recommendations to the British Columbia Police Commission as to the need for less than lethal force options for the police in British Columbia.

Section 1.4**Research Methods**

The Committee's research proceeded in five stages which are outlined below:

- A. studies were undertaken to determine the present state of affairs in British Columbia relative to police use of less than lethal force. In this regard, each municipal police department was contacted to determine less than lethal weapons issued. In addition, Justice Institute and police department defense and firearms instructors were contacted to determine existing training programs and course training standards;
- B. contact was made with other Canadian police agencies (R.C.M.P., Ontario Provincial Police, municipal police departments) to determine less than lethal force methods and training utilized in these jurisdictions;
- C. contact was made with major United States police agencies to determine less than lethal force methods and training utilized in these jurisdictions. (F.B.I., Los Angeles Police Department, Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department, San Diego Police Department);
- D. an on-site visit was made to the training or tactics sections at the following United States police organizations:

Association of Police Planning and Research Officers (International)
Conference; Phoenix, Arizona, November, 1989
Los Angeles Police Department
Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department
San Diego Police Department
San Diego County Sheriffs Department
Glendale Police Department, Glendale, Arizona; and

- E. as the findings of the committee were developed, consultation was continued with agencies who had provided assistance.

Although literally hundreds of persons were interviewed during the course of the research, the following persons were of particular help and their assistance was greatly appreciated.

Sgt. Ron Ryan	(Los Angeles Police Department Training Academy Tactics Section)
Officer Robert Jarvis	(Los Angeles Police Department Training Academy Self-Defense Section)
Agent Thomas Ward	(F.B.I. Training Academy, Quantico, Virginia)

D/S Daniel Cusiter	(Los Angeles Sheriffs Department Special Weapons Team)
Sgt. Dave Jones	(San Diego Police Department Police Academy Coordinator)
Sgt. Richard Mulleneaux	(Glendale Arizona Police Department)
Sgt. Len Aitchison	(Ontario Provincial Police)
Cpl. John McKay	(Vancouver Police Department Self Defence and Fitness Coordinator)
Dr. John J. Janson	(Huntingdon Beach, California; Author of "Classifying the Police Use of Force")
Dr. George Thompson	(Police Tactical Communication Instructor, Albuquerque, New Mexico)
Agent John Hall	(Unit Chief, Firearms Training Unit, F.B.I. Training Academy, Quantico, Virginia)
Agent Larry Bonney	(Unit Chief, Self Defence and Physical Fitness Unit, F.B.I. Training Academy, Quantico, Virginia)
Sgt. Brad Hunt	(Emergency Task Force, Metropolitan Toronto Police Department)

Section 2

An Overview of the Legislative and Regulatory Framework Surrounding the Use of Force by Police Officers in Canada and British Columbia

Section 2.1

Legislative Provisions

Legislative provisions which authorize and limit the use of force by police officers are contained within sections 25, 26 and 27 of the Criminal Code of Canada. These sections are as follows:

25. (1) Every one who is required or authorized by law to do anything in the administration or enforcement of the law

- (a) as a private person,
- (b) as a peace officer or public officer,
- (c) in aid of a peace officer or public officer, or
- (d) by virtue of his office,

is, if he acts on reasonable grounds, justified in doing what he is required or authorized to do and in using as much force as is necessary for that purpose.

(2) Where a person is required or authorized by law to execute a process or to carry out a sentence, that person or any person who assists him is, if that person acts in good faith, justified in executing the process or in carrying out the sentence notwithstanding that the process or sentence is defective or that it was issued or imposed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction.

(3) Subject to subsection (4), a person is not justified for the purposes of subsection (1) in using force that is intended or is likely to cause death or grievous bodily harm unless he believes on reasonable grounds that it is necessary for the purpose of preserving himself or any one under his protection from death or grievous bodily harm.

(4) A peace officer who is proceeding lawfully to arrest, with or without warrant, any person for an offence for which that person may be arrested without warrant, and every one lawfully assisting the peace officer, is justified, if the person to be arrested takes flight to avoid arrest, in using as much force as is necessary to prevent the escape by flight, unless the escape can be prevented by reasonable means in a less violent manner.

26. Every one who is authorized by law to use force is criminally responsible for any excess thereof according to the nature and quality of the act that constitutes the excess.

27. Every one is justified in using as much force as is reasonably necessary:

- (a) to prevent the commission of an offence
 - (i) for which, if it were committed the person who committed it might be arrested without warrant, and
 - (ii) that would be likely to cause immediate and serious injury to the person or property of anyone, or
- (b) to prevent anything being done that, on reasonable grounds, he believes would, if it were done, be an offence mentioned in paragraph (a).

In addition, section 92 of the Criminal Code makes provision for the possession of prohibited or restricted weapons by police officers engaged in their duties. This provision has significance relative to less than lethal force equipment since several less than lethal force weapons are prohibited weapons under the Criminal Code. (e.g.: MACE, tear gas, nunchaku sticks, TASERS, etc.)

Section 92 reads as follows:

92. (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Act,

- (a) a member of the Canadian Forces or of the armed forces of a state other than Canada that are lawfully present in Canada,
- (b) a peace officer or public officer of a class prescribed by the regulations for the purposes of this Part,
- (c) an officer under the Immigration Act the Customs Act, chapter C-40 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1970 or the

Excise Act, or

(d) a person who, under the authority of the Canadian Armed Forces or a police force that includes peace officers or public officers of a class referred to in paragraph (b), imports, manufactures, repairs, alters, modifies or sells weapons for or

on behalf of the Canadian Armed Forces or that police force, is not guilty of an offence under this Act by reason only that, in the case of a person described in any of paragraphs (a) to (c), he has in his possession a restricted or prohibited weapon for the purpose of his duties or employment and, in the case of a person described in paragraph (d) he has in his possession a restricted or prohibited weapon in the course of his business on behalf of the Canadian Armed Forces or a police force referred to in that paragraph.

(2) Notwithstanding anything in this Act, no operator of or person employed in a museum approved for the purposes of this Part by the Commissioner or the Attorney General of the province in which it is situated is guilty of an offence under this Act by reason only that he has in his possession a restricted or prohibited weapon for the purpose of exhibiting that weapon or of storing, repairing, restoring, maintaining or transporting that weapon for the purpose of exhibiting it.

Section 2.2 Regulatory Provisions - British Columbia

Sections 42 and 74 of the British Columbia Police Act contain provisions relating to the establishment of standards and regulations for municipal police officers in British Columbia.

Section 42 (i)(g) outlines a responsibility of the B.C. Police Commission to make recommendations to the Solicitor General relating to minimum standards for selection, training, firearms, equipment and any other related matter.

Section 74 creates an authority for the Lieutenant-Governor in Council to make regulations relating to policing.

The sections involved are as follows:

42.

(1) It is the Commission's function to

- (a) administer, pursuant to Part 9, complaints about the conduct of provincial and municipal constables,
- (b) hear appeals from decisions of police boards in disciplinary matters as provided by the regulations,
- (c) inspect and report upon the quality and standard of police services delivery, including without limiting the foregoing,
 - (i) inspecting police operations and procedures,
 - (ii) evaluating programs for training persons who intend to become constables, constables who require retraining and constables who are eligible for advanced training, and
 - (iii) evaluating standards of policing.
- (d) maintain a system of statistical records as required to carry out inspections, evaluations and research studies,
- (e) consult with and give information and advice to chief constables, boards and committees on matters related to police and policing,
- (f) make recommendations to the minister in regard to the appointment of members of municipal police boards,
- (g) make recommendations to the minister on minimum standards respecting selection and training of constables, the use of firearms and equipment and any other matter relating to police and policing.
- (h) establish and carry out, or approve and supervise, programs to promote cooperative and productive relationships between constables and the public,
- (i) assist in the coordination of policing by the provincial police force and municipal police forces, and
- (j) perform other functions and duties assigned to the commission pursuant to this Act or the regulations.

The Commission shall submit copies of a report completed under subsection 1.

74. *The Lieutenant Governor in Council may make regulations and, without limiting the foregoing, the Lieutenant Governor in Council may make regulations*

- (a) *providing for or granting financial aid to the administration and course of study in a police training school or other educational institution,*
- (b) *developing procedures for the handling of complaints from members of the public against police constables,*
- (c) *for the government of police forces and governing the qualifications, ranks, conduct, training, duties, suspension, promotion, dismissal and punishment of members of police forces,*
- (d) *prescribing the minimum salary or other remuneration and allowances to be paid to members of police forces,*
- (e) *prescribing the minimum remuneration to be paid to the members of boards or committees who are designated by the Lieutenant Governor in Council or appointed by the minister,*
- (f) *prescribing the minimum number of members of police forces that shall be employed either on a basis of population, area, property assessment or a combination of them, or on another basis,*
- (g) *prescribing requirements respecting offices, buildings, places of detention and materiel to be provided by municipalities,*
- (h) *prescribing or regulating the number of meetings to be held by boards and committees, the times and places they are to be held and the public notices and methods, to be employed regarding the meetings,*
- (i) *prescribing the records, returns, books and accounts to be kept and made by police forces or the members,*
- (j) *prescribing the method of accounting for fees, costs and other money that comes into the hands of members of police forces,*
- (k) *providing for the payment of fees and expenses to witness at hearing or appeals under this Act,*
- (l) *prescribing the deployment, deportment, discipline and training of auxiliary constables,*
- (m) *prescribing the administration of rewards offered in respect of an offence, and*
- (n) *providing for the disposal of property where the provincial police force obtains custody of stolen or abandoned personal property.*

At the present time in British Columbia there are a number of Regulations in place which have been passed by Order in Council following B.C. Police Commission recommendations to the Solicitor General. These regulations include standards relating to firearms, discipline, uniforms and recruit training.

Section 2.3 Regulatory Provisions - B.C. Municipal Police Departments

Section 28 of the Police Act enables municipal Police Boards to make rules in relation to administration of the municipal police force concerned. The section reads as follows:

28. (1) *Every board shall make rules not inconsistent with this Act and the regulations respecting the*
- (a) *standards, guidelines and policies for the administration of the municipal police force,*
 - (b) *prevention of neglect and abuse by its municipal constables, and*
 - (c) *efficient discharge of duties and functions by the municipal police force and municipal constables.*
- (2) *a rule under subsection (1) shall not be enforceable against any person until it is filed with the Commission.*

A review of the rules found in B.C. municipal police departments indicates differences in regulations respecting use of force and use of less than lethal force options. Section 12 of this report outlines suggestions regarding departmental rules relating to use of less than lethal force.

Section 2.4 Summary

This section has outlined the statutory (Criminal Code) provisions which authorize and limit the use of force by police officers. The Criminal Code Section 92 which authorizes police officers to possess prohibited weapons such as MACE or TASERS has also been outlined.

B.C. Police Act sections relating to the establishment of provincial regulations and individual police department rules has also been reviewed.

Section 12 of this report outlines several recommendations relating to regulations in terms of less than lethal force options. These recommendations deal with options which should be prohibited as well as mandatory reporting and training requirements.

Section 3**A Discussion regarding "Liability" and the Onus Upon Organizations to provide Adequate Training and Equipment**

In the United States police agencies have become quite concerned over the past 10 years with the issue of "vicarious liability". This concern has arisen due to a large number of civil litigation cases which have occurred.

The pattern these cases follow is fairly standard and is as follows:

- A. a police action occurs which results in serious injury to a member of the public; (often times a use of force or high speed pursuit)
- B. a civil action is filed by the plaintiff which names the various defendants including the police agency involved;
- C. when the case eventually goes to trial a central issue becomes whether the police agency involved had provided adequate training, policy and equipment in relation to the incident which is before the court; and
- D. if it can be proven that the police agency had not met a reasonable standard in relation to issues such as policy or training then often times the agency will be held liable for a portion of the eventual civil award.

This sort of litigation is becoming quite common in the United States and there are in fact legal firms and police "experts" who specialize in this sort of work in the Los Angeles area.

During the course of developing this report we spoke to many U.S. police administrators who very strenuously argued that police agencies and police training bodies must carefully and consistently review their training, policy and equipment in areas where there are likely to be injuries to the public (in particular use of force and police pursuits). This review should be done with a view towards ensuring that training, policy and equipment are adequate and current.

There have been instances in the United States where arguments have centred on the less than lethal force issue. Attempts have been made to place liability upon a police agency by arguing points such as the following:

- A. the officer was not properly trained (either initially or in-service) in use of a piece of equipment such as a baton and as such injury occurred; or
- B. the officer was not properly trained (either initially or in-service) in use of a technique such as carotid restraint and as such injury occurred; or
- C. the officer was not equipped with a piece of less than lethal equipment which the police department should have reasonably foreseen as being necessary; or
- D. adequate supervision was not provided by the police department especially relative to employees with a past history of aggressive behaviour; or
- E. inadequate policy and procedure within the police department in relation to the use of force.

Civil litigation cases involving police have not as yet evolved to this extent in Canada. It would however seem prudent for police agencies to be cognisant of this trend. In addition, the argument that police agencies need to carefully and consistently review areas where the public is likely to be injured is a reasonable one from a professional and public safety standpoint.

Section 4 The Concepts of "Incremental" Force Models and "Situational" Force Models

Section 4.1 "Incremental" Force Model

The Justice Institute of British Columbia and most police departments in British Columbia instruct an "incremental" force model when providing officers with conceptual training relative to the use of force. The "incremental" model defines approximately 5 or 6 levels of force as follows:

- A. Appearance/Communication
- B. Open Hand Tactics
- C. Closed Hand Tactics or Kicks
- D. Baton
- E. Carotid Control
- F. Firearm

Officers are instructed to commence at a lower level of force and escalate the level if the situation worsens. A depiction of this model is attached as appendix A to this report.

Section 4.2 Alterations to the "Incremental" Force Model

During research in the United States it was determined that major agencies have found problems with the incremental model in three respects:

- A. training an officer to commence at the lowest level of force has produced serious operational consequences. There are occasions where officers under stress have reverted to their training and have attempted to commence with lowest levels of force when dealing with suspects armed with firearms;
- B. the approximately 5 or 6 levels of force (or force options) are too limited and additional options such as CAPSICUM and pain compliance tools have been added as force options; and
- C. there have been civil litigation problems associated with the incremental force model. Legal arguments have been advanced that the incremental model requires that all lower levels of force must be exhausted prior to adopting higher levels of force. The situational model on the other hand emphasizes "reasoned discretion" in terms of the use of force options.

Section 4.3 The "Situational" Force Model

Major agencies in the United States have adopted a circular shaped "situational" force model for conceptual use of force instruction to police officers. A depiction of the model is attached to this report as appendix B.

The model has the following features:

- A. the officer is placed in the centre of the situation; (or model)
- B. dependent upon the situation the officer is trained to select the appropriate, least violent necessary force option;
- C. if the situation worsens or improves then the officer is trained to reevaluate the situation and select a more appropriate force option given the changed situation;
- D. the model contains enough force options (including several less than lethal ones such as capsicum or MACE) to allow for the handling of any situation which might be encountered.

Section 4.4 Conclusions

Section 12 of this report outlines a recommendation that the Justice Institute of B.C. commence instruction of the situational force model.

The addition of less than lethal force options to the presently existing 6 force options is central to this report. Sections 6,7,8,9 and 10 review the various less than lethal force options which are available. Recommendations regarding the addition of less than lethal options are made in section 9 of this report.

Section 5 A Precautionary Discussion Regarding Oversimplification of Less than Lethal Force Issues

Section 5.1 Retrospective Analysis of Lethal Force Situations

During the course of researching this report the committee had an opportunity to study several incidents where officers had utilized force during an encounter with a suspect. There is invariably a tendency during these reviews to "armchair quarter-back" the situation and come up with a better way that the officer could have handled the incident.

A review of an officer's handling of a use of force situation is certainly necessary from both legal and organizational standpoints. From a legal standpoint review is necessary to determine whether an officer acted within the use of force provisions of the Criminal Code. From an organizational standpoint, the incident must be reviewed to determine whether training is adequate or whether a similar situation could be prevented in the future, or handled in a more effective manner.

We would urge persons who review use of force situations to be very cognizant of the fact that persons reviewing the incident are in a far different position from the officer involved in the incident. The most obvious differences are as follows:

- A. the reviewer has a great deal of time to carefully evaluate the situation and make decisions. By contrast the officer may have to evaluate, make a decision and take action in a split second; and
- B. the reviewer is not placed in any jeopardy during the review process. By contrast the officer may be placed in extreme jeopardy while he or she is trying to evaluate and make decisions; and
- C. there are many factors which can affect a situation (lighting, weather, fatigue, etc.) that a review person may be unaware of unless they ensure that their investigation is thorough.

Retrospective evaluations of force situations can be far more complex than they appear and care should be taken not to oversimplify.

Section 5.2 Marketing of Less Than Lethal Force Products by "Experts"

In the course of preparing a list of less than lethal force options the committee was exposed to numerous companies marketing products.

On several occasions experts provided glowing recommendations in relation to products which they themselves were selling (on some occasions these individuals offered their expert opinions as to why a competing product was substandard).

We found it a conflict of interest for experts to offer their opinions while endorsing a specific product which they have a financial interest in.

Evaluations of equipment should be conducted in a practical environment by "experts" (police or otherwise) who have no financial interest in the product.

Evaluations of equipment should certainly not be "simplified" to the point where an expert opinion from a person selling the product is relied upon to any great extent.

Section 5.3 The Definition of Less Than Lethal Force

For the proposes of this report we have defined a "less than lethal force option" as follows:

"A less than lethal force option is a force option which is highly unlikely to cause death or serious injury to a suspect when properly applied by a police officer."

The two underlined terms in the definition require further clarification:

- A. "highly unlikely" to cause death or serious injury to a suspect is intended to convey that it is possible but highly improbable that the option would cause death or serious injury.
- B. "properly applied" is intended to convey the importance of proper training relative to force options. Improperly applied force options (such as carotid control) can and will cause death.²

When dealing with less than lethal force options it is important to understand that no option is 100% less than lethal 100% of the time. There are occasions where less than lethal options may have contributed to death.

It is an oversimplification to assume that "less than lethal" means the option is absolutely guaranteed not to cause death or serious injury.

Section 5.4 Simplification of Less than Lethal Force to the Extent that an Officer is Placed at Undue Risk

During the course of research for this report at no time did any resource person suggest that the less than lethal options available should be exclusively used by an officer in grave and immediate danger.

None of the less than lethal options available are as effective as a police service handgun in three respects:

- A. the handgun is more readily drawn and brought into action; and
- B. the handgun tends to be more accurate; and
- C. the handgun has a far more immediate incapacitation effect.

This report will make recommendations which may ultimately lead to patrol police officers having at their disposal less than lethal options such as capsicum spray. Given the correct circumstances (time to draw the spray and aim it properly, sufficient distance from the suspect, etc.) this may result in an officer being able to effect the arrest of a knife wielding suspect without resorting to lethal force. Given the "wrong" circumstances (no time to draw the spray and aim it, suspect at close quarters, etc.) an officer might well be forced to select the lethal option.

Nothing in this report is intended to suggest that police officers should be placed in a position of using a less than lethal option where use of such an option would place them in grave danger.

Section 5.5 Practicalities of Certain Less Than Lethal Options for Patrol Use

The sections of this report dealing with less than lethal equipment have distinguished Emergency Response Team (E.R.T.) equipment from "general duty" or patrol equipment.

This differentiation is made since some less than lethal equipment is completely impractical for patrol applications. (stun grenades, Arwen guns, etc.).

When examining practicality of a piece of equipment for patrol officers it is necessary to examine factors such as whether the article can be worn on the belt, how much specialized training is required, etc.

There are viable less than lethal force options available which are made impractical since they are unsuited to a general duty application.

Section 6**A Listing of Less than Lethal Force Alternatives Currently Available in North America**

During the course of preparing this report the committee attempted to evaluate all of the less than lethal force alternatives which are found in North America. Following is a list of the alternatives which were evaluated.

There is a possibility that there are less than lethal alternatives available which the committee did not become aware of. The following list does, however, represent all of the alternatives which major agencies such as the L.A.P.D. and F.B.I. are aware of.

LISTING

1. Arwen Gun
2. Electronic Stun Devices
3. MACE
4. Capsicum
5. Baton
6. Carotid Control
7. Closed Hand Tactics or Kicks
8. Grapple Nets or Poles
9. Systemic Chemical Agents
10. Verbal Control/Presence
11. Pain Compliance Tool
12. Heavy Metal Flashlights
13. Stunning Explosives
14. Tear Gas
15. Water Cannons
16. Saps
17. Open Hand Tactics

The above seventeen (17) alternatives have been reviewed by the committee and sections 7, 8, 9 and 10 of this report outline our findings in detail.

A summary of the next four sections is as follows:

- A. Seven (7) less than lethal alternatives are not recommended for use in British Columbia. These seven are as follows:

Electronic Stun Devices
MACE
Grapple nets or poles
Systemic Chemical Agents
Heavy Metal Flashlights
Water Cannons
Saps

- B. Three (3) less than lethal alternatives are recommended for use by patrol and special duty police officers in British Columbia. Immediate testing and evaluation of these alternatives are recommended:

Capsicum
Pain Compliance Tool (Orcutt Nunchaku)
Side handle baton

- C. Two (2) less than lethal force alternatives are in use by E.R.T.s in British Columbia. These two alternatives are as follows:

Stunning Explosives
Tear Gas

- D. Two (2) less than lethal options are recommended for testing and evaluation by E.R.T.:

Capsicum Grenades
Arwen Guns

- E. Five (5) less than lethal force alternatives presently utilized by patrol or special duty officers in British Columbia are reviewed. Suggestions are made relative to upgrading their utilization. These five alternatives are as follows:

Baton
Carotid Control
Closed Hand Tactics or Kicks
Verbal Control/Presence
Open Hand Tactics

Section 7 A Review of Less Than Lethal Force Alternatives Which Presently Are Utilized in British Columbia

Section 7.1 Overview

During the course of developing this report the Committee reviewed the less than lethal force options presently utilized in British Columbia. These options, taught at the J.I.B.C. Police Academy, are as follows:

- appearance/communication
- open hand tactics
- closed hand tactics or kicks
- baton
- carotid control
- firearms are the last option and are considered lethal

Section 4 of this report has reviewed the incremental model which is taught in respect to the six (6) options.

The J.I.B.C. Police Academy course material was reviewed and compared to material taught in major centres in Canada and the U.S. The course material (with exceptions noted below) was similar to course material found in major centres and we have no recommendations in relation to the majority of the instruction.

There are two areas where significant improvement could be made. These areas relate to training outlines and development of provincial in-service standards. These areas are outlined below.

Section 7.2 Training Outlines

Most police agencies in the United States are very careful to fully document in a written outline all details and instruction relating to a given force option. These outlines are generally referred to as training circulars and are laid out as follows:

- A. background relative to the use of the force option including legal grounds and how the option fits into the situational force model;
- B. specific techniques including written and pictorial descriptions of how to use them;
- C. any precautions which should be noted relative to the force option;
- D. specific actions not to take in terms of a force option;

- E. reporting requirements;
- F. course training standards for the instruction;
- G. knowledge and skills test requirements for successful completion of the training; and
- H. recommended in-service modules for upgrading and refresher training relative to the force option.

These circulars are reviewed annually (or as needed if an emergent issue arises) to ensure they are current.

The Committee strongly recommends that the J.I.B.C. Police Academy adopt these outlines for each of the less than lethal force options. Further details are outlined in section 12 of this report.

Section 7.3 In-Service Training Standards

As was noted in (G) above, the training units of major agencies outline recommended in-service modules for maintenance of training relative to each force option. There are no regulated standards requiring in-service training (upgrading or refresher) of less than lethal force options for police in British Columbia.

The Committee strongly recommends that the J.I.B.C. Police Academy develop in-service standards relative to less than lethal force options and make these standards available to municipal police departments. The simplest method of accomplishing this objective would be to circulate to each police department the training circulars outlined in Section 7.1 above. Further discussion is made of this recommendation in section 12.

Section 7.4 Carotid Restraint and Tactical Communications Training

During research for this report the Committee had occasion to discuss the carotid restraint hold with many police self-defence experts. Although the hold continues to be utilized in most agencies, concerns exist regarding the possibility of serious injury or death during usage of this option. The advent of other options (capsicum or pain compliance tools) may eventually make carotid control an option which should not be utilized.

Section 9.1 of this report recommends that the J.I.B.C. Police Academy adopt a module which specifically trains tactical communications skills. Many agencies in the U.S. devote specific training to this lowest level option since it is always preferable to resolve an incident at this level of force.

Section 7.5 Summary

The existing less than lethal force options utilized in British Columbia were reviewed by the Committee. The majority of the instruction presently provided in B.C. is consistent with instruction found in major police agencies.

Improvements recommended are as follows:

- A. the instruction provided for each less than lethal force option should be published in training circulars as noted in Section 7.1;
- B. in-service training standards should be in place for each less than lethal force option; and
- C. specific training in tactical communications skills should be provided in relation to the presence/communication level of force. (further details in Section 12)

The carotid restraint hold needs to be reviewed periodically to ensure it is still appropriate given the advent of other options such as capsaicin.

**Section 8 Less Than Lethal Force Options Available in North America Which
are not Recommended for Use in British Columbia**

Section 8.1 Electronic Stun Devices

Within the United States two versions of the "stun gun" are marketed and in use by some police agencies. These devices generate a high voltage/low amperage current into a suspect and thereby cause incapacitation. The two versions are as follows:

- A the one is a hand-held device with two short metal prongs which must be touched to the suspect's body while the current is turned on;
- B. the other is a hand-held device which shoots out two barbed hooks to a distance of approximately 15 feet. The hooks affix to the suspect's skin or clothing and are attached to the hand-held unit by thin wires. The current is transmitted to the suspect through the wires and can be controlled from the hand-held portion of the device.

These devices have been in use for a number of years but concerns are mounting regarding their usage. These concerns include the following:

- A. The close contact device is not an effective weapon against any armed suspect since the officer is required to touch the suspect with it. Getting this close to a knife-wielding suspect is grossly unsafe;
- B. there have been documented applications of electronic stun devices where fatalities have occurred;³
- C. both devices are not 100% effective. A U.S. tactics instructor cited empirical statistics which would indicate that 25% of the time the suspect is able to resist the current and is not incapacitated;
- D. there have been storage/shelf-life battery problems with these devices , leading to operational failures;
- E. these devices can be ineffective against persons wearing several layers of clothing. This is not as much of an issue in Arizona, but could be quite significant in British Columbia.

On balance, we are not prepared to recommend the adoption of these devices within British Columbia.

Section 8.2 MACE

The term "MACE" is a commercial product description for tear gas (CS or CN) which is disseminated from an aerosol canister. The aerosol canister can be any size but the most commonly found size is a cylindrical shape approximately 1.25" in diameter and 5" high. This size of canister can be carried on a police officer's duty belt.

MACE gained widespread usage in the United States during the 1970's. Many police agencies issued MACE to their officers and patrol officers were commonly seen carrying a canister of MACE in a belt holster.

During the past 5 years there has been a trend away from usage of MACE by both large U.S. police agencies and individual officers. Reasons cited for this trend include the following:

- A. MACE is not effective against all suspects and can have no effect at all on crazed or extremely intoxicated persons; (the committee was able to locate a reference which cited a 20% failure to incapacitate rate for MACE⁴) and
- B. MACE presents serious contamination problems for police, health care and custodial workers who have subsequent dealings with a "MACED" subject; and
- C. MACE has no effect on vicious dogs; and
- D. there are documented instances of MACE causing severe eye damage.⁵

On balance, we would not recommend that MACE be considered for use as a less than lethal alternative in British Columbia. Section 9 of this report outlines a recommendation regarding CAPSICUM spray and we are of the view that this is the best way to proceed in terms of aerosol incapacitants.

Section 8.3**Grapple Nets or Poles**

The use of capture poles or grapple nets as non-lethal force options was examined during the study. None of the U.S. police agencies canvassed had successfully implemented this sort of option and it was not in use in major agencies anywhere in the U.S. so far as could be determined.

The Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department experimented with capture poles approximately 10 years ago. They were found to be operationally ineffective for reasons including:

- A. the long stand-off distance and slowness of deployment result in a suspect being able to elude the noose or net end of the pole; and
- B. it takes time to deploy and put together the telescoping sections of the pole. This delayed deployment time limits the pole's operational utility.

It is not recommended that capture poles or grapple nets be pursued as less than lethal force options in B.C. On balance, other options such as the Arwen gun or CAPSICUM may have far greater usefulness.

Section 8.4**Systemic Chemical Agents**

Agencies within the U.S. were queried regarding the use of tranquillizer darts (similar to those used by Conservation Officers for bears) to incapacitate suspects. No agency has successfully employed tranquillizer darts, with reasons cited including the following:

- A. systemic tranquillizers do not generally have an immediate effect and as such, are not operationally effective for incapacitating an armed suspect;
- B. the safe dosage can be difficult to calculate for a suspect of unknown weight;
- C. there can be significant legal and medical problems associated with the involuntary drugging of a suspect; and
- D. delivery systems are not multi-shot or particularly effective.

After reviewing these reasons and observing a complete lack of use by U.S. agencies, it is recommended that these sorts of systemic chemical incapacitants not be pursued.

Section 8.5 Heavy Metal Flashlights

Most police departments issue their officers with a heavy metal flashlight. These flashlights are utilized to provide illumination which is certainly necessary during police duties in a dark environment.

On occasion, these flashlights are pressed into use as a force alternative during violent confrontations. Our research would indicate that heavy metal flashlights are not satisfactory police impact weapons. Their heavy weight combined with relatively small length can result in severe injuries particularly if utilized for an overhand blow to the head.

Section 12 of this report outlines a recommendation that the B.C. Police Commission submit regulations which prohibit the use of heavy metal flashlights as impact weapons.

Section 8.6 Water Cannons

There have been experiments in the United States with the use of water cannons as less than lethal force options. These experiments have not produced a workable piece of equipment which would have utility as a patrol based alternative.

The larger vehicle mounted water cannons (used in some parts of the world for crowd control) are a possibility for use by E.R.T.s. E.R.T. personnel who we consulted in the United States advised that the water cannon was an expensive and unwieldy piece of equipment with far less utility than other E.R.T. options such as the ARWEN gun and stun grenades.

On balance we are not prepared to recommend the water cannon as a less than lethal force alternative in British Columbia.

Section 8.7 Saps

Saps are short leather clubs which contain a lead centre. They are a crude impact weapon which was utilized by police agencies several decades ago. Some police departments in British Columbia have stores of these weapons. They are designed to be used for a blow to the head and can produce serious injury.

Section 12 of this report recommends that Saps be prohibited from use through regulations pursuant to the Police Act.

Section 9 Less Than Lethal Force Options Available to Patrol and Special Duty Officers in North America Which are Recommended for Use in British Columbia

Section 9.1 Tactical Communications Training

At the present time in British Columbia, police officers are taught to utilize appearance and communication as a force option. The J.I.B.C. Police Academy emphasizes this option in various subject areas such as Crisis Intervention, Human Relations, Investigation and Patrol, etc.

Major centres in the U.S. have developed specialized training (described as "tactical communications") in this area. At the present time over 40,000 in-service and recruit officers in California are receiving a 3 day training program in tactical communications. Preliminary indications are that this training is resulting in a significant reduction in police use of physical force and complaints against police.

Most of the training in the U.S. in this area is being conducted by Dr. George Thompson. (ex-Kansas City P.D. officer who received a Ph.D in Communications from Princeton) Thompson is President of the "Verbal Judo Institute" in Albuquerque, New Mexico.

The Committee had an opportunity to view this training in California. In addition, we spoke to many line and supervisory police officers who spoke highly of the training.

The Committee recommends that the J.I.B.C. Police Academy develop a module of tactical communications training for delivery to recruit and in-service officers in the province. In this regard the Police Academy may wish to contact Dr. Thompson or other experts in this area.

Section 9.2 Side Handle Batons

During the course of developing this report the Committee devoted a large amount of time to the issue of police batons.

Baton training in British Columbia was reviewed and recommendations are made in section 7 and 12 relating to course outlines and in-service (refresher) training.

The type of baton suitable for issuance was reviewed at length. The Committee has some strong reservations about straight batons and we would recommend quite strongly that the B.C. Police Commission invoke regulations which require usage of a side handle baton only. Following is a discussion relating to the issue.

There are 3 types of baton which are currently in use in North America by police agencies. These batons are as follows:

- A. the straight baton;
- B. the side handle baton; and
- C. various other "newer" types which include telescoping and spring loaded batons.

The straight baton is currently in use in British Columbia and is also in use in several other Canadian provinces. The straight baton is not the prevalent baton in use in the United States and was largely abandoned 10 years ago in the U.S. for some of the reasons which are discussed below.

The side handle baton is utilized by most agencies in the United States. Major agencies such as the L.A.P.D. and San Diego P.D. issue this baton to their officers in a uniform (PR-24) configuration and plainclothes (PR-18) configuration.

There also exist several "newer" types of batons which telescope or are spring loaded. These batons are not prevalent but are found in some smaller agencies.

During the course of research for this report we consulted with the instructors who teach baton tactics in the major agencies such as L.A.P.D. The instructors we contacted were opposed to the straight handle baton for the following reasons:

- A. the straight handle baton, because of its inherent design, is prone to use a "clubbing" impact weapon using either overhand or side-hand swings;
- B. this usage can occur by officers who are poorly trained or by officers who are well trained but who revert to "clubbing" behaviour under operational stress; and
- C. there have been numerous documented serious injuries (generally trauma to the head) when this occurs.

The instructors we contacted were also opposed to the "newer" telescoping batons for the following reasons:

- A. the telescoping batons have a smaller diameter than 1.25" batons. When the baton strikes a suspect the force is generated over a smaller area which will increase risk of injury; and
- B. telescoping or spring loaded batons require servicing to ensure that their mechanical components are functional; (straight or side handle batons require no servicing) and
- C. there are occasional failures to telescope or spring which can have dire operational consequences.

The side handle baton is strongly supported by the instructors in major agencies since its inherent design (side handle grip) renders it a defensive weapon much less likely to cause serious head injury.

It is also strongly supported as an effective weapon for jabs, blocks and blows to the torso and limbs. Training time for use of the side handle baton is similar to training time for the straight handle baton. (approximately 9 hours initial training plus 4 hours in-service annually)

The Committee is of the view that the side handle baton is the most appropriate baton for police use. As such a six month trial period should occur.

The issuance of side handle batons will place some financial and training burdens upon municipal police departments. Reequipping and retraining will take time and will have to be phased-in in a rational manner.

The Committee is cognizant of the problem this will cause municipal police agencies. The unfortunate fact is that straight handle impact weapons are prone to use in overhand or sidehand clubbing motions. Eventually this is going to produce a serious consequence for a municipal police member and his department. We are of the view that a change to the side handle baton may be necessary as a preventive measure.

Section 9.3 Capsicum

Capsicum is an organic extract of cayenne pepper. The extract is quite pungent and is an inflammatory agent to the eyes and mucous membranes.

This product has been marketed in the United States to police agencies under the product name "CAP-STUN".⁶ The police version of this product consists of a canister (cylindrical in shape approximately 5" high and 1.25" in diameter) which can be worn on the belt. The canister contains 5% Oleoresin Capsicum and 95% Isopropanol. The canister is advertised by the manufacturer as providing over 150 one second sprays. The spray is advertised as being accurate to 10 feet. Grenades (for E.R.T. use) are also available.

The U.S. police agencies contacted by the Committee are extremely impressed with the operational utility of capsicum. They cite features such as the following:

- A. the incapacitation effect is immediate and works on all suspects including those who may be mentally deranged, high on drugs or intoxicated.
- B. there are no decontamination problems; (the isopropanol propellant evaporates.)

- C. there are no documented instances of death or serious injury occurring from usage of CAPSICUM;
- D. it is effective on vicious animals; and
- E. practical considerations (shelf life, accuracy of the spray, size of the canister, amount of training needed, etc.) are all positive with respect to CAPSICUM.
- F. reasonable cost. (a tin of 200 one second sprays is about \$10.00)

A report to the Ontario Solicitor General dated February, 1990⁷ contains comments which are consistent with the above findings.

During 1988 and 1989 the F.B.I. Firearms Training Unit conducted extensive testing and research relative to capsicum. They are commencing issuance to field officers (spray canisters) and E.R.T.s (grenades and spray canisters) at the present time.

The Committee strongly recommends immediate testing of capsicum with a view towards adoption as a less than lethal force option in British Columbia. Specific details of the recommendation are outlined in section 11 of this report.

Section 9.2 Pain Compliance Tool (Orcutt Police Nunchakus)

The ORCUTT Police Nunchaku (commercial trade name) is a less than lethal force alternative which is gaining considerable popularity in the United States. At the present time the San Diego⁸ and Los Angeles Police Departments are conducting operational testing of the nunchaku.

The nunchaku is a modified version of a martial arts weapon. It consists of two cylindrical polycarbonate cylinders joined by a 4" braided nylon rope.⁹ The nunchaku is primarily utilized as a pain compliance tool and not as a striking weapon. (a common reaction when first hearing of the nunchaku is to envision "Bruce Lee" sorts of impact usage.) The nunchaku sticks are placed on the wrist, arm or ankle. When brought together the sticks exert pressure and cause intense pain which leads to compliance.

Operational testing to date has indicated a significant reduction in the amount of force which officers need to conclude a violent situation. (rather than deliver blows to the suspect the nunchakus are utilized to force the suspect to comply with hand-cuffing.)

A set of police nunchakus costs about \$50.00. An immediate trial period of six months is recommended. Training to a proficient level takes a minimum of 16 hours. A trial period will determine objectively if this tool is effective and appropriate for use in British Columbia.

**Section 10 Less Than Lethal Force Options Available
to Emergency Response Teams**

Section 10.1 The Arwen 37 Rifle

The Arwen 37 rifle is a 37 mm. barrellled and rifled weapon with a 5-shot rotary magazine. It is capable of accurately delivering the following low lethality projectiles:

- rubber cylindrical batons;
- tear gas canisters;
- stun grenades.

Many E.R.T.s in the United States make use of the Arwen gun as a non-lethal force option. In a circumstance where a suspect is armed with a knife, axe or other similar weapon, a tactical team contains the area and deploys the Arwen gun approximately 30 yards away from the suspect. If the opportunity arises, then the suspect is shot in the torso area using the rubber baton. The baton knocks the suspect over and generally incapacitates him for a period of time. Arrest teams then move in and handcuff the suspect.

Tactical teams cited the following benefits of the Arwen gun:

- i) it is very accurate compared to other similar weapons;
- ii) the rotary magazine provides the capability of second shots if the first misses or is ineffective;
- iii) the baton round is of relatively low lethality and generally causes only bruising with occasional fractures;
- iv) the Arwen is useful for tactical purposes (tear gas, stun grenades) besides the baton round.

At the present time in British Columbia, no tactical teams are utilizing the Arwen gun. It is strongly recommended that this gun be added to the inventory of tactical teams and that the appropriate training be conducted. Section 12 of this report further outlines this recommendation.

There are jurisdictions in the United States where Arwen guns are placed in NCO cars as a less than lethal force option. This may be worthy of consideration within B.C. after operational testing by E.R.T. Teams has occurred.

Although expensive, (about \$4,000.00) the Arwen is the only less than lethal weapon that can be used effectively at distances greater than ten feet with accuracy. This option allows for maximum officer safety.

Section 10.2 Stunning Explosives

Stun grenades are explosive grenades which are utilized by E.R.T.s in very limited circumstances which include hostage rescues and extreme high risk drug raids.

The grenade produces a loud bang combined with a bright flash. There is no lethal fragmentation generated by the grenade. The effect of the flash and bang is such that a suspect is distracted and disoriented. Stun grenades have been used on armed suspects on many occasions; often times the suspect loses control of his weapon and can be taken into custody without the need to escalate to a lethal level of force.

Stun grenades require extensive training and detailed tactical planning prior to actual deployment. They can also cause serious injury or death. As such, their use should be restricted to E.R.T.s who are operating under the command of a Field Commander.

Section 12 of this report outlines a recommendation for municipal police departments regarding use of stunning explosives by E.R.T.s.

Section 10.3 Tear Gas

E.R.T.s make use of CS or CN tear gas for a variety of purposes specific to E.R.T. situations. The tear gas is disseminated through the use of grenades, ferrets, projectiles and by blast dispersion.

Tear gas can be utilized to incapacitate a suspect during a tactical situation. (The Vancouver Police Department E.R.T. successfully disarmed a knife wielding male suspect utilizing tear gas in 1989).

Tear gas usage requires extensive training and tactical planning prior to actual deployment. Usage of tear gas is restricted to E.R.T.s who are operating under the command of a Field Commander.

Section 12 of this report outlines a recommendation for municipal police departments regarding use of tear gas by E.R.T.s.

Section 10.4 Capsicum Grenades

Generally, the same advantages of capsicum used as a spray, apply to the capsicum grenade. Training and cost are minimal.

Section 12 of this report outlines a recommendation for municipal police departments regarding the use of capsicum grenades by E.R.T.s

Section 11 Use of Force Reporting and Creation of a J.I.B.C. Police Academy Use of Force Coordinator Position

Section 11.1 Use of Force Reporting

During the course of researching this report the Committee became aware of a use of force reporting system in many police agencies. These agencies require the reporting (on a brief but detailed form) of use of force in circumstances such as the following:

- where a suspect is injured;
- where a suspect is rendered unconscious;
- where a spray such as capsicum is used;
- where an impact weapon is used;
- where the use of lethal force was avoided with a less violent option.

This reporting provides an excellent statistical base for the development of training programs and policy. It also prevents abuse of weapons such as capsicum since mandatory reporting is required.

Section 12.2 of this report recommends that the B.C. Police Commission submit a Regulation which requires the mandatory reporting of use of force by police.

Section 11.2 Creation of a J.I.B.C. Police Academy Use of Force Coordinator

This report has identified many issues relating to the use of force by police officers in British Columbia.

A full time coordinator at the J.I.B.C. Police Academy would be able to coordinate various important functions relating to this area. Some of these functions include:

- development of Training Circulars;
- establishment of training and policy;
- liaison with municipal departments;
- monitoring of court cases, civil actions, etc.;
- researching of new use of force issues;
- review of existing subject areas to ensure currency;
- examination of use of force statistics; and
- assist in development of bona fide "in house" training qualification and updates with police departments.

Many major police agencies ensure that a full time coordinator is dedicated to this important area.

The Committee would strongly recommend that the J.I.B.C. Police Academy establish this position. Recommendations relating to establishment and funding are outlined in Section 12 of this report.

Section 12 Recommendations and Methods of Implementation

Section 12.1 Recommendations Relating to the Justice Institute of British Columbia Police Academy

1. It is recommended that the Police Academy continue to instruct the various less than lethal force options which are presently taught. The course material is generally current but the following changes should be undertaken:
 - (i) the conceptual "incremental" force model be abandoned in favour of the "situational" force model;
 - (ii) a "Training Circular" be developed for each less than lethal force option which contains all of the subject matter outlined in section 7 of this report. The Training Circulars are to be made available to municipal police departments so that they are aware of current training in the option as well as recommended in-service standards; and
 - (iii) "Training Circulars" become part of the recruit training manual.
2. It is recommended also that the Police Academy develop a tactical communications module for instruction relative to the APPEARANCE/COMMUNICATION force option. The material should be drawn from the most current training which is occurring in the U.S.
3. It is recommended that the Police Academy liaise with the municipal police departments to determine whether a force options instructor's course is feasible. This would allow training of members in each police department who could then conduct refresher training for the rest of the department. This concept ensures continuity in the system and reduces costs relative to refresher training.
4. To bring about all of the above and to facilitate some of the recommendations listed below, it is recommended that the Police Academy establish a full time coordinator's position relating to use of force by police officers in British Columbia. The coordinator would be responsible for ensuring that training and equipment are current. Other duties would flow from the position including development of Training Circulars, liaison with municipal police departments, review of police academy individual subject areas to ensure currency, etc. We would recommend that the coordinator be a seconded municipal police officer who has the necessary written and verbal skills and who also has both operational and training experience in police use of force.

5. It is recommended that the Police Academy report to the British Columbia Police Commission relative to these recommendations quarterly.

This recommendation will require provincial funding surplus to that the Police Academy presently receives. (See Section 12.4)

Section 12.2 Recommendations Relating to the British Columbia Police Commission

1. It is recommended that an immediate operational testing of Capsicum be made with a view towards adopting this as a less than lethal force option for police officers in British Columbia.
2. It is recommended that an immediate operational testing of the side handle baton be made with a view towards adopting this as a less than lethal force option for police officers in British Columbia.
3. It is recommended that an immediate operational testing of nunchaku sticks be made with a view towards adopting them as a less than lethal force option for police officers in British Columbia.
4. It is recommended that the B.C. Police Commission submit Police Act Regulations which would prohibit use by police officers of the following:
 - (i) saps
 - (ii) electronic stun devices
 - (iii) systemic chemical agents
 - (iv) MACE (except by E.R.T. Personnel where specialized applications of aerosol tear gas may be needed)
5. It is recommended that the B.C. Police Commission submit a Police Act Regulation which prohibits the use of heavy metal flashlights as impact weapons.
6. It is recommended that the B.C. Police Commission submit a Police Act Regulation which requires mandatory reporting of police use of force in certain circumstances. (outline of the recommended circumstances are contained in Section 11.1 of this report.)
7. It is recommended that the B.C. Police Commission not consider grapple nets (or poles) or water cannons as a viable option at present in terms of less than lethal force options.
8. It is recommended that the B.C. Police Commission liaise with the Vancouver Police Department to obtain an operational test of the ARWEN 37 gun which has been budgeted for by that Department's E.R.T. Following the testing it may be appropriate that this option be adopted by other E.R.T.s in the Province.

9. It is recommended that the Police Commission carefully monitor the force option known as carotid control. This monitoring should be ongoing with a review towards eliminating the option if it becomes inappropriate.
10. It is recommended that the B.C. Police Commission remain seized of this matter to ensure that some of the recommendations are followed up.
11. It is recommended that the operational tests involve police departments for a six month period commencing after the initial training.

Section 12.3 Recommendations Relating to the Municipal Police Departments

1. It is recommended that municipal police departments develop procedures to ensure that all serving members receive proper training (both initial training and annual refresher training) in the various less than lethal force options.

The development of Police Academy Training Circulars and force options instructors training will facilitate this activity.

2. It is recommended that municipal police departments allow their Emergency Response Tactical Teams to continue their specialized use of stunning explosives and tear gas. In this regard municipal police departments should monitor the E.R.T. groups to ensure training and equipment are current.

Section 12.4 Recommendations Relating to the Province of British Columbia (Solicitor General Ministry)

1. It is recommended that the Province of British Columbia ensure that funds are made available so that the J.I.B.C. Police Academy is able to establish a police use of force coordinator's position. The projected cost of this position including training material is \$80,000.00.

Section 13**Executive Summary**

The Committee has spent over a year researching this topic and developing the report. During the course of the year we interviewed over one hundred police officers who are involved in the instruction of less than lethal force options. In addition we were able to interview several criminologists and communications instructors who have specialized in the area of police use of force.

Our recommendations have addressed various issues including training, equipment and regulations. We believe that if the recommendations outlined in this report are followed then police officers in British Columbia will be equipped and trained on a level consistent with the best police forces in the world.

There will be costs associated with our recommendations. We would respectfully suggest that spending the money now will save an enormous amount of suffering and cost later. The effect of crippling or disabling injury that may have been unnecessary is a life sentence to a police officer or a citizen alike. Such cost is incalculable.

Increasing violence in our society will require police to more frequently exercise "reasoned discretion" in selecting a force option. Officers who are provided with the appropriate number of options (and current training in those options) will be able to handle themselves in a safe and professional manner. This handling of situations in a safe and professional manner will ultimately safeguard both the officer's life and the lives of the public he or she serves.

Section 14 Acknowledgements

The Committee would like to acknowledge the assistance which was provided by the following persons and organizations:

1. Chief Constable R.J. Stewart and the Vancouver Police Department for funding Sergeant Battershill's participation on the Committee.
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3. Ms. Anne MacLachlan (Coordinated Law Enforcement Unit Policy Analysis Division) for assistance with graphics contained in the report.

Section 15

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
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APPENDIX A

INCREMENTAL LEVEL OF FORCE MODEL




INCREMENTAL LEVEL OF FORCE MODEL




APPENDIX B

SITUATIONAL FORCE MODEL



The situational force model requires selection of the least violent means available relative to the situation. The officer relies upon reasoned discretion in making the selection.

SITUATIONAL FORCE MODEL



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**REFERENCE SOURCES WHICH HAVE BEEN UTILIZED
DURING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THIS REPORT
AND WHICH MAY BE OF INTEREST
FOR FURTHER READING IN THIS SUBJECT**

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